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received an “Ineffective” audit opinion and other firms that received clean 
audit opinion on the effectiveness of the internal control over financial re-
porting under Section 404 of SOX. Our analyses show the following. First, 
we find that auditors charge significantly higher audit fees for all firms in 
the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period. Second, we find that audi-
tors’ opinions on the weakness in internal control (WIC) are positively as-
sociated with audit fees, and that the positive association between the two 
is pronounced primarily in the post-SOX period, but not in the pre-SOX 
period. Third, we find that clients with WIC problems that are highly levered 
and/or report losses pay incrementally higher audit fees during the post-
SOX period. We also find that Big 4 audit fee premiums increase signifi-
cantly for all clients during the post-SOX period, regardless of whether the 
clients have WIC or not. Overall, our results suggest that auditors, in terms 
of their behavior and pricing mechanism, responded to an upward shift in 
the strength of the legal liability regime caused by the SOX enactment.
Keywords: Internal control, Audit fees, Legal liability, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
INTRODUCTION
A series of corporate scandals that started with the Enron debacle 
and the subsequent collapse of Andersen LLP triggered the United 
States (U.S.) Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 
in an attempt to restore public confidence in the quality of audited 
financial statements. One of the most contentious measures man-
dated by SOX is related to the efficacy of a firm’s internal controls 
over financial reporting (ICOFR). Section 404 of SOX mandates man-
agement to assess the effectiveness of a firm’s ICOFR and to report 
its conclusion in the firm’s annual reports for fiscal years ending af-
ter November 2004. Section 404 also requires the auditor to review 
management’s assessment, and then, to report her own conclusion 
regarding the effectiveness of the ICOFR. 
Corporate executives have increasingly voiced doubts about the 
net benefits of this controversial regulation, and have often claimed 
that the costs of Section 404 compliance are excessively high com-
pared with the associated benefits alleged by regulators and law-
makers. For example, cross-listed foreign Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) registrants often express that they are consider-
ing withdrawing their American Depository Receipts (ADR) listings 
from the US exchanges due to the high compliance cost.1) Given that 
a non-trivial component of the Section 404 compliance cost is an in-
  1) See two recent speeches by SEC Commissioners (SEC 2005a, 2005b). 
The Effect of Internal Control Weakness Under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley ~ 3
crease in audit fees and that data on auditors’ assessment of clients’ 
internal controls have now become publicly available, it is interest-
ing and timely to examine whether and how the auditor incorporates 
her own assessment of the strength or weakness of a client’s inter-
nal control system into audit pricing.    
In this paper, we first investigate whether the enactment of SOX 
lead to an increase in the level of audit fees for all firms, regardless 
of the effectiveness of their ICOFRs. As further explained in the next 
section, SOX caused not only an increase in audit work but also an 
increase in auditors’ legal liabilities. We therefore predict that audi-
tors charge higher audit fees for all firms in the post-SOX period 
than in the pre-SOX period to compensate for the additional audit 
effort to comply with the SOX requirements and to compensate for 
the expected increases in legal liability costs.  
Second, we examine whether and how auditors’ assessments of 
material weaknesses in internal controls (hereafter WIC) of their cli-
ent firms are priced in the audit fee-setting process. In doing so, we 
analyze auditors’ opinions on the effectiveness of the ICOFR that are 
reported in recently filed 10-K reports, and identify client firms that 
received an “Ineffective” opinion on the ICOFR from their auditors. 
We label these ‘ WIC clients.’ 2) We predict that auditors charge higher 
audit fees for WIC clients than for non-WIC clients because clients 
with WIC problems are more likely to have accounting errors or ir-
regularities and to engage in opportunistic earnings management, 
compared with clients without WIC problems (Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al. 2007). Auditors must therefore exert more engagement efforts to 
audit WIC clients than to audit non-WIC clients. In addition, audi-
tors are likely to be exposed to a higher litigation risk, other things 
being equal, when auditing WIC clients than non-WIC clients. As a 
result, auditors are likely to charge higher audit fees for WIC clients 
than for non-WIC clients - to compensate for the higher effort and/
or the increased litigation risk associated with the audits of WIC cli-
ents. 
Third, we test whether the positive relation, if any, between WIC 
and audit fees emerged only after the passage of SOX. Thus, we pre-
  2) In fact, Section 404 of SOX does not require firms to improve the efficacy of their 
internal controls, but it does require management to assess it and disclose their 
assessment in the company’s annual report. It further mandates auditors to re-
port their opinions on management’s assessment in their audit reports. In this 
sense, Section 404 can be viewed as a pure disclosure regulation.  
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dict that the effect of WIC on fees will be stronger in the post-SOX 
period than in the pre-SOX period. This test allows us to make infer-
ence on how the effect of auditors’ WIC assessment on the audit fees 
interacts with a shift in the auditors’ legal liability caused by the en-
actment of SOX. 
In addition to testing the above three predictions, we further ex-
amine whether SOX affected the audit fee structure. Specifically, 
we study the impact on audit fees of client-specific risk and audi-
tor quality. Client-specific risk factors (e.g., leverage and loss) and 
auditor quality (Big 4 vs. non-Big 4 auditors) are likely to interact 
with WIC, and lead to high-risk clients with WIC problems and Big 4 
auditors being even more exposed to potential legal liabilities subse-
quent to the enactment of SOX. We therefore examine whether and 
how the fee-increasing effect of client-specific risk and auditor qual-
ity differs systematically between the pre- and post-SOX periods, 
and this difference, if any, is greater for WIC clients than for non-
WIC clients.
We test our hypotheses using audit fee data for the five-year peri-
od from 2000 to 2004 and data on auditors’ opinions on WIC under 
Section 404 of the SOX that are recorded in recent 10K reports filed 
from February 2005 to May 2005. The results of our various tests 
reveal the following. First, we find that audit fees are, on average, 
significantly higher for all firms in the post-SOX period than in the 
pre-SOX period after controlling for all other factors that are deemed 
to affect audit fees, suggesting that SOX lead to increases in audit 
effort and/or auditors’ legal liabilities. Second, we find that firms 
that received an “Ineffective” opinion on the ICOFR from their audi-
tors in response to Section 404 of SOX (i.e., firms with WIC prob-
lems) pay higher audit fees, and that this positive association be-
tween audit fees and the weakness in internal control is pronounced 
primarily in the post-SOX period (2003~2004), but not in the pre-
SOX period (2000~2002). This suggests that the effect of WIC on fees 
was driven by the upward shift in legal liability which resulted from 
the enactment of SOX. We also find that highly levered clients and/
or clients reporting losses with WIC pay higher audit fees, compared 
with i) not-highly-levered and/or profit-reporting clients with WIC 
and ii) clients without WIC during the post-SOX period. However, we 
find that Big 4 audit fee premium increased for all clients during the 
post-SOX period, irrespective of whether the clients had WIC prob-
lems. 
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Our study contributes to the existing literature in the following 
ways. Several studies have examined the issue of WIC in various 
contexts such as the relation with accrual quality or earnings man-
agement (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Hogan and Wilkins 2008), 
cross-sectional determinants of WIC (Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and 
McVay 2005), and stock market reactions to WIC disclosure (Be-
neish et al. 2008; DeFranco et al. 2005; Hammersley et al. 2008). 
Specifically, previous research of Hogan and Wilkins (2008) and 
Hoitash et al. (2008) examines the relation between WIC and audit 
pricing. Our study provides further evidence how WICs interacts 
with other client-specific risks and auditor quality. Simunic and 
Stein (1996) argue that audit fees reflect client-specific litigation 
risk. More recently, Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic (2008: hereafter 
CKLS) provide a theory and, using country-level litigation risk meas-
ures, suggest international evidence showing that audit fees reflect 
expected legal liability costs. However, prior research has paid little 
attention to the issue of how WIC influence an auditor’s assessment 
of client-specific litigation risk because data on auditors’ assess-
ment of WIC for public companies became publicly available only 
after Section 404 were implemented. In short, our results provide 
useful insights into how the auditors, in terms of client risk assess-
ment and pricing mechanism, respond to a shift in the legal liability 
regime associated with the enactment of SOX. The higher level of 
auditors’ attention to the risky clients, as reflected in higher audit 
fees in the post-SOX period, could imply more audit effort, assign-
ment of more experienced or expert auditors, and/or the increased 
fee per hour for the clients. To the extent that these changes lead to 
the higher audit quality, evidence provided in this study supports 
the view that the SOX enactment accomplished its regulatory objec-
tives at least partially. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, 
we briefly discuss the new requirements for WIC disclosures and 
attestation under Sections 302 and 404 of SOX, and offer a review 
of prior studies related to WIC issues. Section 3 develops hypotheses 
while section 4 describes the sample, data sources and empirical 
procedures. Section 5 presents the results of our hypothesis testing. 
In section 6, we perform further analyses on the effect of the SOX 
and various sensitivity checks.  The final section concludes the pa-
per.  
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THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Background
The summary of the major SOX provisions that are important to 
accounting and auditing areas are reported in Appendix. Among 
them, Sections 302 and 404 of SOX are concerned with the internal 
controls over financial reporting (ICOFR). In particular, Section 302, 
which became effective for quarterly and annual reports covering 
periods ending after August 29, 2002, requires that chief executive 
officers (CEO) and chief financial officers (CFO) evaluate the design 
and effectiveness of internal controls and disclose any known 
material weakness, fraud, or changes in controls that are likely to 
have a material effect on financial statements. Compared with the 
Section 404 requirements, however, Section 302 requires relatively 
less extensive investigations and assessments by management, 
and does not specify specific procedures that management and the 
auditor must follow.  
Section 404, which became effective for fiscal years ending 
after November 15, 2004 for accelerated filers,3) has two main 
parts. Section 404(a) describes management’s responsibility for 
maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures 
for financial reporting as well as responsibility for assessing the 
effectiveness of ICOFR. Section 404(b) mainly describes auditors’ 
responsibility for attesting to management’s report on the WIC 
assessment and their own assessment on the effectiveness of 
ICOFR.  
Along with Section 404, the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (2004) has adopted Auditing Standard No. 2, An Audit of In-
ternal Control over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with 
an Audit of Financial Statements. The Standard requires an integrat-
  3) A non-accelerated filer (a U.S. company with market capitalization less than $75 
million that has filed at least one annual report with the SEC) must first comply 
with the SOX 404 requirements for its first fiscal year ending on or after July 
15, 2007. The extension does not apply to a foreign private issuer that is an ac-
celerated filer and that files annual reports on Form 20-F or Form 40-F; such 
an issuer must begin to comply with the internal control over financial reporting 
and related requirements in the annual report for its first fiscal year ending on or 
after July 15, 2006. We exclude non-accelerated filers and foreign firms from our 
sample.
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ed audit of both financial statements and ICOFR, and requires audi-
tors to express two separate opinions on: (1) whether the financial 
statements are fairly stated; and (2) whether the ICOFR is effective. 
The auditor is not permitted to conclude that the company’s ICOFR 
are effective if there are one or more material weaknesses in the reg-
istrant’s internal controls. In the event of a material weakness, the 
auditor could express an unqualified opinion (i.e., “fairly stated”) on 
management’s assessment so long as management properly identi-
fies the material weakness, and conclude in their assessment that 
the internal controls are ineffective. If the auditors conclude that a 
material weakness exists but management does not and therefore 
concludes in their assessment that internal control is effective, the 
auditors should render an adverse opinion on management’s as-
sessment.4)
Literature Review
Since the passage of SOX in 2002, several studies have investi-
gated various issues related to internal controls using the WIC data 
disclosed under Section 302. For example, Ge and McVay (2005) 
find that WIC are positively associated with business complexity 
but negatively associated with firm size and profitability. Doyle et 
al. (2007) report a similar set of WIC determinants. In addition, they 
find that WIC clients have lower earnings quality measured by the 
extent to which accruals map into cash flows. Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al. (2007) document that clients with more complex operations, 
recent changes in organization structure, more accounting risk 
exposure and less investment in internal control systems are more 
likely to disclose WIC. They also find that clients with WIC tend to 
have greater abnormal accruals and more frequent restatements of 
financial statements relative to their industry peers, consistent with 
the notion that WIC contribute to lower quality accounting informa-
tion. Using the data for the period prior to the enforcement of Sec-
tion 302 of SOX, Krishnan (2005) finds that firms with an indepen-
  4) Among our 252 sample firms that received an “Ineffective” opinion on the ICOFR 
from their auditors, only two firms received “not fairly stated” opinion on man-
agement assessment of the effectiveness of ICOFR and all the others received an 
unqualified opinion.  This suggests that prior to the issuance of the opinion, the 
auditor and management have agreed on significant deficiency or material weak-
ness in ICOFR in most cases since Section 404 was enacted.
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dent audit committee with financial expertise are less likely to have 
WIC.5)
On the other hand, Beneish et al. (2008), DeFranco et al. (2005), 
and Hammersley et al. (2008) examine stock market reactions to 
management’s disclosure of WIC under Section 302. Overall, these 
studies find that the market reacts negatively to WIC disclosures.6) 
These findings support the view that information about WIC is 
value-relevant.
A few studies examine the effect of the WIC disclosure under Sec-
tion 302 and/or Section 404 on audit pricing. Hogan and Wilkins 
(2008) examine the effect of WIC disclosure under Section 302 on 
audit pricing. They find that audit fees of clients that disclosed WIC 
under Section 302 are higher than those of other clients. Under 
Section 404, Raghunandan and Rama (2006) and Hoitash et al. 
(2008) similarly find that audit fees for fiscal year 2004 are higher 
for clients with WIC compared to clients without such a weak-
ness. Hoitash et al. (2008) also report that the severity of the WIC 
influences the audit fees.
Our study also investigates the effect of WIC on audit pricing but 
differs significantly from prior studies in the following ways. First, 
while they investigate the relation between WIC disclosed under 
Section 302 or 404 and the audit fees in the fiscal year that WIC 
were disclosed, we use a longer period of audit fee data covering the 
year 2004 (when auditors were required to express their opinions on 
ICOFR for the first time) and previous four years. The use of a longer 
time-series of audit fee data allows us to investigate whether there 
are changes in the audit fee-WIC association from the pre-SOX to 
the post-SOX period. We also address the issues of the interactions 
between WIC and other client characteristics, and changes in Big 4 
audit fee premiums for the comprehensive analyses of audit pricing 
mechanism changes caused by the enactment of SOX.
  5) Before the enactment of the SOX, firms were required to publicly disclose infor-
mation on the internal control weakness (if any) pointed out by the predecessor 
auditor when they file 8-K to the SEC, only if there was a change in auditor (SEC 
1988).
  6) More specifically, DeFranco et al. (2005) and Beneish et al. (2005) find cumulative 
size-adjusted returns of -1.8 percent and -1.73 percent over the three day window 
surrounding the WIC disclosures by 102 and 336 firms, respectively. Similarly, 
Hammersley et al. (2005) find negative size-adjusted returns and an increase in 
trading volume around the WIC disclosure.
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Hypotheses Development
The enactment of SOX in 2002 caused a substantial change in the 
duties and responsibilities of external auditors of public companies. 
Specifically, Section 404 requires auditors to conduct an integrated 
audit of the financial statements and the internal control systems. 
Anecdotal evidence to date indicates that the audit fees paid by SEC 
registrants increased substantially subsequent to the enactment of 
SOX.7)
The audit fee literature dates back to Simunic (1980). In his 
model, audit fees (or total audit costs) are a function of the expected 
costs of conducting the audit including a normal profit margin 
plus the expected costs of audit risk or the expected legal liability 
losses associated with an audit failure. Formally, his model can be 
expressed as:
E(tc) = cq + E(d)* E(r) (1)
where E(tc) is the expected total cost to the auditor; c is per unit 
cost of resources; q is quantity of resources used by the auditor in 
performing the audit; E(d) is the expected present value of possible 
future losses due to undetected material misstatements in this 
period; E(r) is the likelihood that the auditor will be liable from 
future litigation associated with undetected material misstatements 
in this period. 
Previous audit fee research has relied on the above model when 
examining whether auditors price the expected litigation costs as 
well as their effort or resource costs when setting audit fees, and 
found a positive relation between audit fees and various proxies for 
litigation risk.8) Recently, CKLS extend the Simunic model by devel-
oping a formal model in which the strength (or strictness) of legal 
regime plays a crucial role in determining auditor effort and thus 
  7) For example, Financial Executives International indicated, in its January 2004 
survey, an increase in audit fees of $591,000 due to Section 404 compliance. 
This is equivalent to an increase of 38 percent over pre-Section 404 fee levels. In 
its July 2004 survey, FEI updated this figure to $823,200, or an increase of 92.5 
percent over pre-Section 404 levels.
  8) For more details, see Pratt and Stice (1994), Simunic and Stein (1996), Seethara-
man et al. (2002), and Lyon and Maher (2005).
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audit fees.9) The CKLS model predicts that audit fees increase mo-
notonically with the strictness of legal regime, because as the legal 
regime becomes stronger, the auditor is more likely to suffer from 
legal liabilities in case of an audit failure, and thus charges a higher 
audit fee to compensate for the increased legal liability costs. The 
enactment of SOX and the implementation of other accompanying 
accounting and auditing regulations lead to not only an increase in 
audit effort to comply with the SOX and other related requirements 
but also a significant upward shift in what CKLS call “the strength 
of a legal regime” during the post-SOX period.10) In a similar vein, 
Ijiri (2005) predicts that the civil or criminal litigation risk will in-
crease significantly even for honest firms, and further argues that 
the SOX is likely to reduce investors’ beta risk (the risk of a dis-
honest report being judged to be honest) at the expense of increas-
ing firms’ alpha risk (the risk of honest report being judged to be 
dishonest). We therefore predict that the enactment of SOX causes 
auditors to charge higher audit fees during the post-SOX period to 
compensate for the increases in their legal liabilities as well as audit 
efforts than during the pre-SOX period. To test this prediction, we 
hypothesize in an alternative form:
H1: Other things being equal, audit fees are higher in the post-
SOX period than in the pre-SOX period. 
To prevent or detect material misstatements, the auditor typically 
performs various internal control tests to assess whether the inter-
nal control system of the client firm is properly designed. If the au-
ditor concludes that the internal control system is not appropriate, 
auditing standards require her to perform additional substantive 
  9) Using data from United Kingdom (UK), Seetharaman et al. (2002) also show that 
auditors of UK firms charge higher fees for their services when their clients are 
cross-listed on the U.S. market, suggesting that audit fees reflect country-level 
litigation risk.
10) If we name a few examples, by Title VIII, “Corporate and Criminal Fraud Ac-
countability Act of 2002,” auditors are required to maintain all audit or review 
work papers for five years. Title IX, “White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements” 
increased the maximum criminal penalty for mail and wire fraud from 5 to 10 
years. For the comprehensive summary of the SOX provisions and legal require-
ment changes that are important to auditor/auditing, please refer to the Appen-
dix. For the review of the legislation process of the SOX and the environmental 
changes in the US accounting, please refer to Ijiri (2005).
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tests, and such additional tests may increase her effort or resource 
costs (the first component in Eq. (1) or cq). Moreover, the auditor 
may use an engagement team with more industry-specific expertise 
if any WIC in complex situations requires a high level of industry-
specific knowledge in detecting material misstatements (Johnstone 
and Bedard 2003). Such an audit team may charge a higher billing 
rate to the client, which leads to an increase in the first component 
in Eq. (1) or cq. Alternatively, the greater risk related to an ineffective 
internal control system may cause auditors to charge an insurance 
premium to cover possible future losses associated with undetected 
misstatements (Bell, Landsman, and Shackelford 2001).11) Previous 
research on audit fees finds that audit fees are sensitive to condi-
tions that increase the overall audit risk.12) To the extent that au-
ditors’ effort costs and/or expected litigation costs are greater for 
clients with WIC than for clients with no WIC, auditors are likely 
to charge a higher fee for clients with WIC than for clients with no 
WIC. We therefore hypothesize in alternative form:
H2: Other things being equal, audit fees are positively associ-
ated with material weaknesses in internal controls (WIC).
This hypothesis H2 is equivalent to those in the prior studies of 
Hogan and Wilkins (2008) and Raghunandan and Rama (2006). 
Using H2, we would like to show that the characteristics of our 
sample are not different from those used in prior studies.
In the context of the Simunic’s model in Eq. (1), the enactment 
of SOX caused an   upward shift in an auditor’s assessment of E(d) 
and E(r), and thus lead the auditor to charge even higher audit fees 
for clients with WIC in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX 
period.13) We therefore predict that the fee-increasing effect of WIC is 
more pronounced in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX pe-
riod. To provide evidence on the above prediction, we test the follow-
11) Charging an insurance premium may also be combined with additional substan-
tive tests.
12) Experimental work by Houston et al. (1999) find that the presence of accounting 
choices reflecting higher risks of accounting irregularities leads to higher litiga-
tion risk assessments and fee premiums.
13) In addition, additional audit effort required to attest to the effectiveness of the 
client’s internal control system will be another possible reason for the audit fee 
increase.
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ing hypothesis in an alternative form:
H3: Other things being equal, the positive association, if any, 
between audit fees and WIC is more pronounced in the post-SOX 
period than in the pre-SOX period.   
TEST PROCEDURES
Empirical Model
Building upon previous research on audit fee determinants 
(Chaney et al. 2004; CKLS; Craswell et al. 1995; DeFond et al. 2002; 
Francis and Stokes 1986; Frankel et al. 2002; Sankaraguruswamy 
and Whisenant 2003; Simunic 1980; Simunic and Stein 1996), we 
posit the following audit fee model to test our hypotheses H1, H2 
and H3: 
AFEE = α0 + α1 YR0304 + α2 WIC + α3 (YR0304*WIC) + β1 LEVE 
            + β2 LOSS + β3 BIG4 + γ1 LNTA + γ2  NBS + γ3 NGS 
            + γ4 EMPLOY + γ5 INVREC + γ6 ISSUE + γ7 BTM  (2)
            + γ8 FOREIGN + γ9 EXORD + γ10 AUDCHG + γ11 LAMDA 
            + industry dummies + error term
where, for each firm and in each year: 
AFEE = natural log of fees paid to auditors for their financial 
statement audits (i.e., audit fees) in thousand dollars; 
YR0304 = 1 if the fiscal year is 2003 or 2004 and 0 otherwise;
WIC = A weakness of a client’s internal control variable meas-
ured by either WIC_D, WIC_C, or WIC_P where WIC_D 
equals 1 if a client receives an internal control weak-
ness opinion from its auditor and 0 otherwise; WIC_C 
equals natural log of one plus the number of categories 
of internal control weakness cited in the auditor’s re-
port; WIC_P is the predicted value of WIC_C. The WIC_
D and WIC_C are measured in 2004 and assumed to 
remain the same during the five-year sample period, 
2000-2004, while WIC_P is measured for each firm-year 
observations.
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LEVE = leverage measured by total liabilities divided by total 
assets; windsorized at 5;
LOSS = 1 if the firm reports net loss and 0 otherwise;
BIG4 = 1 if the auditor is one of Big 4 and 0 otherwise;
LNTA = natural log of total assets in thousand dollars;
NBS = natural log of one plus number of business segments;
NGS = natural log of one plus number of geographic segments;
EMPLOY = square root of the number of employees;
INVREC = inventory plus receivables, divided by total assets; 
ISSUE = 1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 3 
years are more  than 5 percent of the total assets and 0 
otherwise;
BTM = book-to-market ratio, windsorized at 0 and 4;
FOREIGN = 1 if the firm pays any foreign income tax and 0 
otherwise;
EXORD = 1 if the firm reports any extraordinary gains or losses 
and 0 otherwise;
RNDTA = research and development expenditure (Compustat data 
item number 46) divided by total assets;
AUDCHG = 1 if the incumbent auditor is different from the last 
year’s auditor and 0 otherwise;
LAMDA = inverse Mills ratio.
In the above, all the independent variables are measured as of 
the end of fiscal year unless otherwise noted. The variables, LNTA 
and EMPLOY, are used as proxies for client size, while the variable, 
NBS, NGS, INVREC, FOREIGN, EXORD, and RNDTA as proxies for 
the scope and complexity of the client’s business. The demand for 
audit services is likely to increase with firm size (LNTA and EM-
PLOY) and the extent of business diversification (NBS and NGS). We 
expect audit fees to be positively associated with these variables. 
Furthermore, audit fees are likely to be higher for clients with more 
complex business operations, so we expect the variables represent-
ing client complexity (i.e., INVREC, FOREIGN, EXORD, and RNDTA) 
to be positively associated with audit fees. In short, all coefficients 
on the aforementioned variables are expected to be positive. 
We also include AUDCHG to control for possible low balling by 
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new auditors (Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant 2003). A negative 
sign on AUDCHG is consistent with the low balling hypothesis. We 
include ISSUE and BTM to capture the effect of the client’s growth 
potential on audit fees. Growing firms are more often involved in 
external financing activities such as equity and bond offerings, and 
the demand for both audit and non-audit services is greater for 
high-growth firms than for low-growth firms. In addition, firms with 
equity and debt offerings in the recent past are in a need of more 
extensive audit services (Reynolds et al. 2004). We therefore expect a 
positive (negative) coefficient on ISSUE (BTM). 
In Eq. (2), we also include LOSS and LEVE, to proxy for a client’s 
risk characteristics. Since auditors charge higher fees for risky cli-
ents (Simunic and Stein 1996), we predict the coefficients on LOSS 
and LEVE to be positive. We include BIG4 to capture the effect of 
audit quality differentiation on audit fees. A positive coefficient on 
BIG4 suggests the existence of a Big 4 fee premium. 
Our variables of interest are YR0304, WIC, and the interaction 
between YR0304 and WIC (i.e., YR0304*WIC). We measure WIC in 
three different ways. The first measure (WIC_D) is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if a client receives a weakness-in-internal control opin-
ion (hereafter WICO) on the effectiveness of ICOFR from the auditor 
in fiscal year 2004, and 0 otherwise. The second measure (WIC_C) is 
a continuous variable, measured by the natural log of one plus the 
number of categories of WIC cited in the auditor’s report in the same 
year. The third measure (WIC_P) is the predicted value of WIC_C. We 
include the predicted value to control for the possible self-selection 
problem by using an instrumental variable approach.14) It is possible 
that firms may have had greater internal control problems in the 
pre-SOX period than in the post-SOX period because WIC did not 
receive serious attention in the pre-SOX period. The use of WIC_P 
at least partially solves this problem by using year-by-year data to 
independently predict the value of WIC_C or WIC_D for each year.
If auditors charge higher audit fees in the post-SOX period than 
in the pre-SOX period as predicted in H1, the coefficient on YR0304 
should be positive (i.e., α1 > 0).
15) Similarly, if firms that receive WICO 
14) WIC_D and WIC_C assume that a firm receiving a WICO in 2004 has the same 
problem from 2000 to 2004 inclusive. This is a strong assumption and is a 
limitation of our work, necessitated because of data availability.
15) We choose year 2003 as the cut-off year to make the dummy variable YR0304. 
Even though the SOX was enforced from November 2002, the year-by-year analy-
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pay higher audit fees as predicted in H2, the coefficient on WIC 
should be positive (i.e., α2 > 0). In addition, if the fee-increasing ef-
fect of WIC is more pronounced during the post-SOX period as pre-
dicted in H3, the coefficient on YR0304*WIC, should be positive (α3 > 
0). Hoitash et al. (2008) report that audit fee structure with respect 
SOX changed from year 2003 even though auditors are required to 
follow section 404 from year 2004. Thus, we choose year 2003 as 
a cut-off year. As explained later in Table 4, our empirical analyses 
also support this prediction. 
In our regression specification in Eq. (2), audit fees are linked to 
WIC and many other control variables. Previous research suggests 
that clients who receive WICO may be inherently different from 
those who do not (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007). 
Suppose that clients who have the ability to pay high audit fees tend 
to keep weak or strong internal control systems. In such a case, 
the error term in Eq. (2) is likely to be correlated with the WIC vari-
able and coefficient estimate is likely to be biased. To address this 
potential self-selection bias, we estimate the two-stage treatment ef-
fect model (Greene 2000). In the first stage, we estimate the probit 
WICO model with WIC_D as the dependent variable and obtain the 
inverse Mills ratio.16) We then include the inverse Mills ratio, denoted 
ses reveal that there exist clear coefficients differences between the period until 
2002 and the period after year 2002. The results for year 2002 are more similar 
to those of year 2000 or 2001 in the year-by-year analyses than those of year 
2003 or 2004. Thus, we select year 2003 as the cut-off year. This result suggests 
that it took about 1 year for the SOX to change the pricing mechanism of the au-
ditors.
16) Following Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) and Doyle et al. (2007), we run the fol-
lowing probit model.
    WIC_D = a + β1 LNTA + β2 GROWTH + β3 INVTA + β4 LOSS + β5 ROA + β6 NBS 
       + β7 NGS + β8  FOREIGN + β9  MA + β10  RESTRUCT + β11  BIG4 + β12  AUDCHG 
       + β13  OWNERSHIP + β14 LITIG_IND + error terms
 where, GROWTH is the assets growth from year t - 1 to year t scaled by the as-
sets of year t - 1; INVTA is inventory divided by total assets, MA is merger and ac-
quisition dummy that has a value of 1 if the firm has any merger and acquisition 
activity in the year, and 0 otherwise; RESTRUCT is dummy variable if the firm’s 
restructuring cost is higher than 1 percent of the sales; OWNERSHIP is a meas-
ure of ownership concentration (1 - [1,000 * (# of shareholders / # of outstanding 
shares)]); LITIG_IND is the litigious industry dummy variable. The definitions of 
other variables are the same as before. We also repeat the tests (i) after removing 
insignificant independent variables, and (ii) after removing the variables that are 
already included in Eq. (2), but the results are always similar. We also perform 
the OLS regression for the same equation as in the above with WIC_C as the 
dependent variable instead of WIC_D and with the same set of independent vari-
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by LAMDA, in Eq. (1) when we use WIC_D as a variable of interest in 
our analyses. Instead, when we use WIC_C, we repeat the test using 
WIC_P, which is the predicted value of WIC_C using an instrumental 
variable approach.
Sample and Data Sources 
We obtain audit fee data from the 2005 Audit Analytics database. 
We retrieve all other financial data from the 2005 Compustat In-
dustrial annual file. Our sample period is restricted to the five-year 
period from 2000 to 2004 because Audit Analytics includes audit fee 
data starting in 2000,17) and the current version of the database in-
cludes the data only up to fiscal year 2004. We exclude the data in 
the financial service industry because the audit fee determinants of 
firms in this industry may differ from those in other industries.
We hand-collected the data on WICO from recently filed 10-K re-
ports. Because Section 404 of SOX applies to annual reports for fis-
cal year ending November 2004, we search the EDGAR database for 
all firms in our sample with fiscal years ending between November 
2004 and February 2005 (inclusive) that filed their 10K reports from 
February 2005 to May 2005. To supplement our initial EDGAR-
based sample, we also refer to the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
database that collected and compiled auditors’ internal control re-
ports from all SEC filings in 2005, and then classified each WIC 
cited in auditors’ reports into 1 of 26 categories, based on the nature 
of the WIC.
In Panel A of Table 1, Section A reports the number of firms in 
our sample that received WICO from their auditors, while Section B 
reports the number of firm-year observations with WICO. As men-
tioned earlier, we hand-collected information on WICO for firms with 
fiscal years ending between November 2004 and February 2005. As-
suming that WIC were constant for each sample firm over the five-
year sample period, 2000-2004, we construct a sample of firm-year 
observations with WICO by including the same firms with WICO 
ables. Using the OLS estimates of regression parameters, we obtain the predicted 
value of WIC_C, namely WIC_P.
17) The SEC’s Final Rule S7-13-00 (Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Indepen-
dence Requirements) requires registrants to disclose information about fees paid 
to the auditor in proxy statements filed on and after February 5, 2001.  
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identified in our 2004 sample into the 2000-2003 sample as long 
as the data requirements for estimating our regression models are 
satisfied.18) As shown in Panel A of Table 1, our final sample consists 
of 2,437 client firms or 9,067 firm-year observations. As shown in 
Section A, 252 of the 2,437 clients (or 10.27 percent of the sample) 
received WICO from their auditors in 2004. Similarly, 88.33 percent 
of the observations have WIC_D that equals 0 and the remaining 
11.67 percent of our sample have WIC_D that equals 1. Panel A also 
reports the number of the categories of WIC cited on the auditor’s 
report. Twenty-eight firms (121 observations) receiving WICOs from 
their auditors have only one category of WIC, whereas 6 firms (25 
observations) have 10 different categories of WIC.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the number of firm-year observations 
by each category of WIC. We collect a total of 26 different categories 
of WIC mentioned in the audit report. Among them, the most 
frequently mentioned WIC is related to the ‘application of GAAP and 
accounting policies’ which comprises 32.61 percent of all WIC.19) 
The next most frequently mentioned WIC is related to ‘review of 
transactions’ which comprises 32.42 percent of all WIC. Because 
some categories of WIC are rarely mentioned, we group WIC into 
15 different categories as reported in Panel B, and combine all 
other 11 categories to the ‘Others’ category. This final category 
comprises 31.47 percent of all WIC. One may argue that auditors 
charge higher audit fees for clients that receive multiple categories 
of WICO. As mentioned earlier, we therefore measure WIC by using 
the continuous variable (i.e., WIC_C) which is defined as natural log 
of one plus the number of WIC categories, in addition to the dummy 
variable (i.e., WIC_D).
18) Implicit here is the assumption that clients that receive WICO in 2004 have a 
similar level of WIC problems in 2000-2003 as well. This is a reasonable assump-
tion in that, as pointed out in footnote 2, Section 404 of SOX does not require 
management to improve the effectiveness of ICOFR, though it requires manage-
ment to disclose its assessment on the effectiveness of ICOFR. The findings of 
Ghosh and Rubberink (2006) also support this assumption. They report that 
companies with WIC have lower earnings response coefficient and less favorable 
common stock rating and debt ratings even before the firms disclose the WIC 
problems. However, as an alternative way to analyze the data without the 
assumption, we use the predicted value of the WIC (WIC_P) for our variable of 
interest in the analyses.  
19) The sum of the percentage (%) in Panel B of Table 1 is greater than 100 percent 
because many client firms receive WICO with multiple categories of internal con-
trol weakness as reported in Panel A of Table 1.
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Table 1. Statistics on weakness in internal control
Panel A: Number of internal control weakness opinions
Number of 
weakness in 
internal control 
Section A
No. of Firms
Section B
No. of firm-year observations
Number % Number %
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2,185
28
73
48
43
20
17
9
3
5
6
89.73
1.14
2.97
1.96
1.75
0.82
0.69
0.37
0.12
0.20
0.24
8,009
121
311
209
178
76
65
41
11
21
25
88.33
1.33
3.43
2.31
1.96
0.84
0.72
0.45
0.12
0.23
0.28
Total 2,437 100.00 9,067 100.00
Panel B: Categorization of the weakness in internal control 
Category
Number of 
observations
%
Application of GAAP/accounting policies
Review of transactions
Tax-related issues
Staffing issues (levels, training, or expertise)
Property, equipment, lease
Policies/documentation issues
Financial statement closing process/controls
Control environments
International operations/subsidiaries
IT & applications
Merger/acquisition-related issues
Inventory management
Revenue/billing
Segregation of duties
Employee benefit/pension
Others
345
343
319
293
277
241
233
198
172
138
136
113
101
93
74
333
32.61
32.42
30.15
27.69
26.18
22.78
22.02
18.71
16.26
13.04
12.85
10.68
9.55
8.79
6.99
31.47
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MAIN RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in 
this study. With respect to the results in Table 2, the following are 
noteworthy: First, the mean AFEE, measured by natural log of audit 
fees in thousand dollars, over the five-year sample period is 6.0235 
which translates into $ 413,022. The median AFEE is 5.9319 with 
a standard deviation of 1.2757, suggesting that AFEE is reasonably 
distributed. Second, the mean WIC_D of 0.1167 indicates that 11.67 
percent of our sample clients received a WICO from their auditors in 
fiscal year 2004. The mean WIC_C is 0.1635 with a relatively large 
standard deviation of 0.4731, suggesting that the WIC_C distribu-
tion is skewed. Finally, the distributional properties of all other 
variables (that are used as control variables in our regressions) are, 
overall, comparable with those reported in previous research on 
audit fee determinants (e.g., CKLS; Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2007). Note that LEVE is windsorized at 5 (approximately 
one percent of observations were extremely large) in order to allevi-
ate the influence of a few extreme outliers on our results. Similarly, 
the BTM is winsorized at 0 and 4. 
Pairwise Correlation among Research Variables
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for the variables included 
in Eq. (2). As shown in Table 3, WIC_D and WIC_C are highly corre-
lated (ρ = 0.948), suggesting that both capture the same underlying 
construct (i.e., WIC). Consistent with H2, both measures are signifi-
cantly and positively correlated with audit fees (AFEE). With respect 
to the correlation among our explanatory variables, the following 
are apparent: First, our two proxies for client-specific litigation risk 
(i.e., LEVE and LOSS) are significantly and positively correlated with 
each other (ρ = 0.106). Second, firm size (LNTA) is significantly and 
negatively correlated with the two proxies. Third, none of the con-
trol variables are highly correlated with two measures of WIC (i.e., 
WIC_D and WIC_C). Fourth, the inverse Mills ratio (LAMDA) is highly 
correlated with several other control variables. Thus, we perform 
analyses with and without the LAMDA variable. Finally, except for 
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Table 2. Distributions of variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1% 50% 99%
AFEE
WIC_D
WIC_C
LEVE
LOSS
BIG4
LNTA
NBS
NGS
EMPLOY
INVREC
ISSUE
BTM
FOREIGN
EXORD
RNDTA
AUDCHG
LAMDA
6.0235
0.1167
0.1635
0.5293
0.4028
0.8894
12.7669
1.0029
0.9833
64.5678
0.2393
0.4872
0.5686
0.4773
0.2296
0.0679
0.0867
1.7863
1.2757
0.3211
0.4731
0.4776
0.4905
0.3137
2.0210
0.4830
0.6315
76.5885
0.1818
0.4999
0.6146
0.4995
0.4206
0.1417
0.2814
0.2378
3.2048
0
0
0.0451
0
0
7.3265
0
0
2.2360
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.3580
5.9319
0
0
0.4791
0
1
12.7305
0.6931
1.0986
38.9101
0.2114
0
0.4078
0
0
0.0039
0
1.7588
9.2003
1
2.0794
2.1748
1
1
17.2799
2.0794
2.3026
370.1351
0.7613
1
3.5834
1
1
0.7812
1
2.6232
Definitions of Variables
AFEE = natural log of audit fees in thousand dollars; 
WIC_D =  1 if the auditor of the client firm receives internal control weakness 
opinion in fiscal year 2004, 0 otherwise; 
WIC_C =  natural log of one plus the number categories of internal control 
weakness cited in the auditor’s report for fiscal year 2004;
LEVE = leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets);
LOSS = 1 if the firm reports a loss during the year, 0 otherwise;
BIG4 = 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 or predecessor auditor, 0 otherwise;
LNTA = natural log of total assets in thousand dollars; 
NBS = natural log of one plus number of business segments;
NGS = natural log of one plus number of geographic segments;
EMPLOY = square root of the number of employees;
INVREC = inventory and receivables divided by total assets; 
ISSUE =  1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 3 years are more 
than 5% of the total assets, 0 otherwise;
BTM = book-to-market ratio, windsorized at 0 and 4;
FOREIGN = 1 if the firm pays any foreign income tax, 0 otherwise;
EXORD = 1 if the firm reports any extraordinary gains or losses, 0 otherwise;
RNDTA = research and development expenditure divided by total assets;
AUDCHG = 1 if auditor is in the first year of audit engagement, 0 otherwise;
LAMDA =  inverse Mills ratio for the receipt of endogenous weak internal control 
opinion.
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the correlation between LNTA and EMPLOY (ρ = 0.687), the mag-
nitude of pairwise correlations among other explanatory variables 
(except for the correlation with LAMDA) does not exceed 0.5, sug-
gesting that our multivariate regressions are unlikely to suffer from 
multi-collinearity problems.20)
Univariate Analyses on Audit Fee Changes around the SOX Enactment 
Panel A of Table 4 reports average audit fees by each year for the 
total sample, for the sample of firms that receive WICO (WIC_D = 1), 
and for the sample firms that do not receive WICO (WIC_D = 0). As 
shown in the table, audit fees for all three samples increase monot-
onically over the sample period, 2000-2004. Consistent with hypoth-
esis H2, audit fees are greater for the WIC sample than for the non-
WIC sample in all years. 
To assess the effect of SOX on audit fees, we further examine 
changes in audit fees from the pre-SOX period to the post-SOX pe-
riod. In Panel B of Table 4, we present the change in AFEE from 
2002 (the year in which SOX was enacted) to 2003 for the WIC sam-
ple and for the non-WIC sample, and test for differences in means 
and medians between the two samples. In doing so, we include only 
those firms that are included in our dataset for both 2002 and 2003 
in our WIC and non-WIC samples. 
As shown in Panel B, the mean and median changes in AFEE 
changes from 2002 to 2003 are 0.3335 (a 7.76% percent increase) 
and 0.2571 (a 4.34 percent increase), respectively, for the WIC 
sample, and 0.2468 (a 5.63 perecent increase) and 0.1942 (a 3.15 
percent increase), respectively, for the non-WIC sample.21) Both the 
mean and median differences are significant, as reported in the 
bottom two rows of Panel B. These results suggest that SOX caused 
20) In performing regression analyses, we also measure the VIF values to test for po-
tential multi-collineraity problems. But none of the VIF values are high enough 
to cause the problem. Thus, we do not separately report the values in the paper. 
As a robustness test, we also drop all the control variables or one of the control 
variables that are highly correlated with other control variable (one by one) and 
perform regression analyses with variables of interest. The results are qualita-
tively similar.
21) In dollar values, the median audit fee changes from $399,076 to $557,721 (a 40 
percent increase) during the period for the clients with WIC, and $334,932 to 
$422,581 (a 26 percent increase) for the clients without WIC.
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Table 4. Audit fee difference between the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods
Panel A: Mean audit fees by year for the total sample, the WIC sample, 
and the non-WIC sample
Year N Total sample
WIC sample
(WIC_D = 1)
Non-WIC sample
(WIC_D = 0)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
1,626
1,740
1,868
1,941
1,892
5.5856
5.6589
5.8200
6.0791
6.8787
5.5984
5.7522
6.0080
6.3239
7.2209
5.5840
5.6483
5.7956
6.0464
6.8304
Panel B: Average audit fee changes from 2002 to 2003 for the WIC and 
non-WIC samples
N
Amount of 
change  
Percentage change 
(%)
WIC sample
(WIC_D = 1)
228
Mean
Median
0.3335
0.2571
7.76
4.34
Non-WIC sample 
(WIC_D = 0)
1,689
Mean
Median
0.2468
0.1942
5.63
3.15
Test for mean differences 
Test for median differences
t value
z value
2.38***
2.61***
1.56*
3.05***
Panel C: Average audit fee changes from years 2001 and 2002 to years 
2003 and 2004 for the WIC and non-WIC samples
N
Amount of 
change 
Percentage change 
(%)
WIC sample
 (WIC_D = 1)
215
Mean
Median
0.9408
0.9571
17.70
16.76
Non-WIC sample 
(WIC_D = 0)
1,378
Mean
Median
0.6988
0.6943
12.49
12.02
Test for mean difference
Test for median differences
T value
z value
7.47***
4.59***
7.35***
6.47***
The amount of change represents the change of the log value of audit fees (in 
thousand of dollars) and the percentage change represents the change in the 
log value of audit fees scaled by the log value of the audit fees at the start of 
the period. *, **, and *** denote p-value < 10%, p-value < 5%, and p-value < 1%, 
respectively with one-tailed tests. 
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audit fees to increase more for firms that received WICO than for 
firms that did not, consistent with hypotheses, H1 and H3.  
In Panel C of Table 4, we present the amount by which AFEE 
changes from the two-year pre-SOX period (i.e., 2001 and 2002) to 
the two-year post-SOX period (i.e., 2003 and 2004) for the WIC sam-
ple and for the non-WIC sample, along with the results of tests for 
the mean and median differences between the two samples. Here, 
the WIC and non-WIC samples consider only those firms included in 
our dataset for both two-year periods. 
As shown in Panel C, the mean and median changes in AFEE 
are 0.9408 (a 17.70 percent increase) and 0.9571 (a 16.76 percent 
increase), respectively, for the WIC sample, and 0.6988 (a 12.49 
percent increase) and 0.6943 (a 12.02 percent increase), respective-
ly, for the non-WIC sample. Both the mean and median differences 
are highly significant, as reported in the bottom two rows of Panel 
C. Similar to the results reported in Panel B, these results reconfirm 
that SOX caused audit fees to increase more for firms which re-
ceived WICO than for firms that did not.  
Results of Multivariate Tests for H1, H2, and H3 
To examine the effect of auditors’ opinions on internal con-
trol weakness (WICO) on audit fees, we estimate various regres-
sions for Eq. (2). Table 5 report the regression results. In Table 5, 
reported t-values are on an adjusted basis using White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix.22) To verify whether 
our dataset produces the coefficient estimates that are comparable 
to those reported in previous research in terms of their signs, sig-
nificance, and magnitude, we first estimate model 1 which excludes 
our test variables, namely WIC, YR0304, and YR0304*WIC from 
Eq. (2). In models 2 (3), we include only one test variable, YR0304 
(WIC). In models 4 and 5, we include both YR0304 and WIC. We 
also estimate models 6 to 9 with all three test variables, YR0304, 
WIC, and YR0304*WIC, included for our hypotheses, H1, H2, and 
H3, respectively. In models 3 to 7, the WIC variable is measured us-
22) We repeat all the regression tests performed in this study by adjusting standard 
errors with a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across 
years of a given firm. Because most of the results are qualitatively identical, we 
do not report them separately, except an exceptional case when the result is dif-
ferent. 
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ing the dummy variable, WIC_D, while in model 8, it is measured by 
the continuous variable, WIC_C, which is natural log of one plus the 
number of WIC categories. In model 9, the WIC variable is measured 
by WIC_P, which is the predicted value of WIC_C. Finally, models 5 
and 7 include LAMDA (inverse Mills ratio), while all other models do 
not.
The results for models 1, 2 and 3 show that all explanatory varia-
bles except ISSUE and AUDCHG are highly significant with expected 
signs for all specifications, and the explanatory power of all three 
models is very high as reflected in the adjusted R 2 of about 71 to 78 
percent. This suggests that a set of audit fee determinants included 
in Eq. (2) as our control variables explain a large portion of cross-
sectional variations in audit fees.     
As shown in Table 5, the coefficient on YR0304 is highly signifi-
cant across all specifications, which strongly supports H1. The re-
sult indicates that auditors charge higher audit fees in the post-
SOX period than in the pre-SOX period, which is consistent with the 
CKLS prediction and anecdotal evidence23) as well as the findings 
in Table 4. In model 3 to 5 where the interaction term YR0304*WIC 
is omitted, the coefficient on WIC is significantly positive, which is 
consistent with H2. This suggests that clients with WIC problems 
pay higher audit fees than do clients without WIC problems. 
However, when we estimate regressions with the interaction term 
YR0304*WIC included, as in models 6 to 9, the WIC-coefficient be-
comes insignificant, but the coefficient on the interaction term, i.e., 
YR0304*WIC, becomes significantly positive in all cases. This indi-
cates that firms with WIC problems in fiscal year 2004 began to pay 
higher audit fees only in the post-SOX period (but not in the pre-
SOX period). The results are robust to whether we use WIC_D, WIC_
C, or WIC_P.24) Thus, it seems that the differences in the audit fees 
between WIC clients and non-WIC clients, as reported in Table 4, 
during the pre-SOX period simply reflect the different firm-specific 
characteristics of the clients rather than the audit fee effect of WIC.
To examine the economic significance of the results, we set all 
variables except WIC to their sample medians and calculate average 
23) See footnote 7 for anecdotal evidence.
24) When we perform analyses with individual categories of WIC mentioned in 
Panel B of Table 1, we find that segregation of duties and property/equipment/
lease are not significantly related to audit fees, while all the other categories are 
significantly associated with audit fees with positive signs. 
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audit fees. Using the estimated coefficients from model 4, this proce-
dure yields average audit fees of $548,986 for non-WIC firms during 
the post-SOX period. This indicates that WIC firms pay higher audit 
fees than do non-WIC firms by $58,952 (or 10.74 percent of audit 
fees). This suggests that the increase in audit fees for WIC firms is 
economically significant as well.
FURTHER ANALYSES
The Effect of the Enactment of SOX on the Audit Fee Structure 
The regression results in Table 5, overall, reveal that auditors 
charge higher audit fees for WIC clients than for non-WIC clients 
during the post-SOX period but not during the pre-SOX period. In 
this section, we further investigate whether and how the legal regime 
shift caused by SOX affects the structure of audit fees, in particular, 
the audit fee effects of client-specific risk and auditor quality.
To do so, we first examine whether the incremental fees that 
auditors charge for clients with WIC to compensate for the increased 
legal liability associated with SOX varies systematically across 
clients, depending on client-specific risk characteristics proxied by 
LEVE and LOSS. Auditors’ assessment of the legal liability is likely 
to be greater when clients are exposed to a higher level of litigation 
risk. Auditors are likely to be exposed to a higher litigation risk 
during the post-SOX period, in particular, for the audits of WIC 
clients. We therefore predict that the fee-increasing effect of client-
specific risk (i.e., LEVE and LOSS) is pronounced during the post-
SOX period, and the effect is even more pronounced for clients with 
WIC problems than those with no WIC.  
Previous research shows that the potential legal liability cost is 
greater for Big 4 auditors than for non-Big 4 auditors, because Big 
4 auditors have greater reputation losses at stake (DeAngelo 1981) 
as well as “deeper pockets,” and thus they have more to lose in case 
of an audit failure (Dye 1993; Khurana and Raman 2004; Kim et 
al. 2003). To minimize this legal liability cost, Big 4 auditors have a 
greater incentive to increase audit effort, for example, by conducting 
more substantive tests than non-Big 4 auditors, which in turn leads 
to Big 4 auditors charging higher audit fees than non-Big 4 auditors 
(CKLS;  Craswell et al. 1995; DeFond et al. 2000). This leads us to 
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predict that the differences in audit fees charged by Big 4 auditors 
vis-à-vis non-Big 4 auditor (i.e., Big 4 fee premiums) are greater in 
the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period.
To test the above two predictions, we posit the following regression 
model which is an augmented version of Eq. (2):
AFEE = α0 + α1 YR0304 + α2 WIC + α3 (YR0304*WIC)
            + β1 LEVE + β2 (LEVE*YR0304) +β3 (LEVE*YR0304*WIC) 
            + β4 LOSS + β5 (LOSS*YR0304) + β6 (LOSS*YR0304*WIC) 
            + β7 BIG4 + β8 (BIG4*YR0304) + β9 (BIG4*YR0304*WIC)   (3)
            + γ1 LNTA + γ2 NBS + γ3 NGS + γ4 EMPLOY + γ5 INVREC 
            + γ6 ISSUE + γ7 BTM + γ8 FOREIGN + γ9 EXORD 
            + γ10 AUDCHG + γ11 LAMDA + industry dummies + error term 
where all variables are as defined earlier. Compared with Eq. (2), we 
add the interaction terms between YR0304 and two firm-specific risk 
variables (i.e., LEVE and LOSS) as well as the BIG4 dummy variable. 
In addition, we also add the variables representing the three-way in-
teractions among the three variables representing client-specific risk 
and auditor quality (LEVE, LOSS, and BIG4), the dummy variable 
representing the post-SOX period (YR0304) and the weakness in in-
ternal control variable (WIC).  
The positive coefficients on LEVE*YR0304 and LOSS*YR0304 in 
Eq. (3) (i.e., β2, β5 > 0) are consistent with the fee-increasing effect of 
client-specific risk (i.e., LEVE and LOSS) being greater in the post-
SOX period than in the pre-SOX period. Moreover, the positive co-
efficients on the three-way interaction terms, LEVE*YR0304*WIC 
and LOSS*YR0304*WIC (i.e., β3, β6 > 0), support the view that the 
incremental fee-increasing effect of client-specific risk (i.e., LEVE 
and LOSS) arising from SOX is greater for clients with WIC than 
for those with no WIC. In a similar vein, the positive coefficients on 
BIG4*YR0304 and BIG4*YR0304*WIC (i.e., β8, β9 > 0) are consistent 
with the view that Big 4 auditors charge higher audit fees during 
the post-SOX period and, in particular, for the audits of clients with 
WIC, compared with non-Big 4 auditors. 
Table 6 presents the results of various regressions for Eq. (3). In 
Table 6, we report the results using WIC_D only, for brevity, because 
the results using WIC_C or WIC_P are qualitatively identical with 
those using WIC_D. With respect to the effect of LEVE on audit fees, 
the coefficient on LEVE is significantly positive in all cases, while 
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the coefficient on the two-way interaction term, i.e., LEVE*YR0304, 
is insignificant in all cases. In addition, the three-way interaction 
term, i.e., LEVE*YR0304*WIC, is significant with a positive sign (as 
in models 2, 5, and 7). The above results, taken as a whole, suggest 
that highly levered firms pay higher audit fees in general, and the 
highly levered firms with WIC problems paid additionally higher fees 
during the post-SOX period, while the firms without WIC problems 
did not pay such incremental fees during the post-SOX period after 
an overall shift in audit fees in the post-SOX period is controlled for 
by YR0304.
With respect to the effect of LOSS on audit fees, the coefficient on 
LOSS itself is significantly positive at the 1% level, while the coef-
ficient on LOSS*YR0304 is insignificant across all cases. The coef-
ficient on LOSS*YR0304*WIC is significantly positive. These results, 
taken as a whole, suggest that firms that report losses generally 
paid higher audit fees. In addition, the loss firms with WIC began 
to pay even higher fees in the post-SOX period, while the loss firms 
without WIC problems paid no marginally higher fees in the post-
SOX period.  
With respect to the effect of BIG4 on audit fees, we find that the 
coefficient on BIG4 itself is significantly positive across all cases, 
suggesting the existence of a Big 4 audit fee premium. Furthermore, 
the coefficient on BIG4*YR0304 is also significant with a positive 
sign in all cases, suggesting that Big 4 audit fee premium increased 
significantly for both clients with and without WIC during the post-
SOX period. However, the coefficients on the three-way interaction 
term, i.e., BIG4*YR0304*WIC, are insignificant across all cases, 
suggesting that Big 4 audit fee premium increased by the similar 
magnitude for both clients, or equivalently WIC clients pay a similar 
level of  the Big 4 premium as do non-WIC clients.
Finally, as shown in Table 6, the coefficients on the WIC variable 
(i.e., α2) are significant in models 1 and 6. When we add the interac-
tion term, YR0304*WIC, as in models 2 to 7, however, the coefficient 
on WIC becomes insignificant and only the coefficient on the 
interaction term (i.e., α3) is significantly positive. These results are 
consistent with those in Table 5 that clients with WIC began to pay 
higher fees from year 2003.25) Also similar to the results reported in 
25) When we estimate clustered standard error by each firm, the weakly significant 
results in models 5 and 7 for the coefficients on YR0304*WIC becomes marginally 
insignificant. 
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Table 5, the coefficients on all the control variables except BTM are 
highly significant with expected signs.
One may argue that the significant correlations among three vari-
ables of interest (LEVE, LOSS, and BIG4) as reported in Table 3 and 
the correlations among the associated interaction terms lead to 
some of their coefficients being insignificant as reported in Table 6. 
To examine this possibility, we estimate Eq. (3) after including only 
one variable of interest and its interaction terms. For example, we 
examine the audit fee effect of BIG4 using the following specification 
which excludes all the variables that contain LEVE and LOSS. 
AFEE = α0 + α1 YR0304 + α2 WIC + α3 (YR0304*WIC) + β1 BIG4 
            + β2 (BIG4 * YR0304) + β3 (BIG4 * YR0304 * WIC) 
            + γ1 LNTA + γ2 NBS + γ3 NGS + γ4 EMPLOY + γ5 INVREC 
            + γ6 ISSUE + γ7 BTM + γ8 FOREIGN + γ9 EXORD (4)
            + γ10 AUDCHG + γ11 LAMDA + industry and year dummies 
            + error term
The regression results for Eq. (4) reveal that the coefficient on 
BIG4*YR0304*WIC is not significantly different from zero, while 
the coefficient on BIG4*YR0304 is significant at 1 percent level. For 
example, we find that β2 is 0.3044 with t = 6.81 and β3 is -0.0812 
with t = -0.73. Overall, the regression results for Eq. (4) are consist-
ent with those presented in Table 6.
Similarly, to examine the LEVE (LOSS) effect, we estimate Eq. 
(4) after replacing BIG4 with LEVE (LOSS). Because the results are 
not qualitatively different from those reported Table 6, we do not 
separately report them for brevity.26) In short, the above results in-
dicate that our results reported in Table 6 are robust with respect 
potential problems of multi-collinearity among the three variables of 
interest, namely, LEVE, LOSS, and BIG4 and the interaction terms 
associated therewith.   
Sensitivity Checks 
We perform a variety of sensitivity analyses to check the 
26) For example, if we replace BIG4 in Eq. (4) for LEVE (LOSS), the value of β3 is 0.2528 
(0.1412) with t = 3.30 (2.37). These results are qualitatively similar to those in 
Table 6.
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robustness of our findings. First, given that the SOX was enacted 
in 2002, it is unclear whether or not the SOX influenced an audi-
tor’s pricing behavior in 2002. As a sensitivity check, we repeat our 
regression analyses after excluding the 2002 data.  We find that the 
exclusion of the 2002 data does not alter our statistical inferences 
on the variables of interest.  
Second, the SOX specifically states that companies that are not 
required to file annual and quarterly reports on an accelerated basis 
(i.e., U.S. companies with market capitalization below $75 million) 
must comply with the Section 404 requirements starting the fiscal 
year ending on or after July 15, 2007. As explained before, our sam-
ple therefore does not include any firms that belong to this category 
because auditors are not required to report any WICO on these 
firms in 2004. We notice, however, that for some of such firms that 
belong to this category, auditors voluntarily report their opinions on 
WIC. As a sensitivity check, we expand our sample by including all 
firms regardless of their size. Using this expanded sample of 12,403 
firm-year observations, we repeat our regression analyses. Though 
not reported, overall, the results using this expanded sample are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. 
Third, we construct a balanced-panel sample by including the 
same set of sample firms throughout the five-year sample period, 
2000 to 2004. Though not reported, the results using the balanced 
panel data are qualitatively identical to those reported in the paper. 
Fourth, we perform tests using the following regression specifica-
tion (with YR0304 excluded) after restricting the data period to the 
post-SOX period (year 2003 and 2004). 
AFEE = α0 + α1 WIC + β1 LEVE + β2 (LEVE*WIC) + β3 LOSS 
            + β4 (LOSS*WIC) + β5 BIG4 + β6 (BIG4*WIC) + γ1 LNTA 
            + γ2 NBS + γ3 NGS + γ4 EMPLOY + γ5 INVREC (6)
            + γ6 ISSUE + γ7 BTM + γ8 FOREIGN + γ9 EXORD 
            + γ10 AUDCHG + γ11 LAMDA + industry dummies 
            + error term 
Consistent with the results reported in Table 6, we find that 
the coefficient on WIC is not significant, while the coefficients, β1 
to β6 are all significant with positive sign except the insignificant 
coefficients of β6. This indicates that all the major inferences we 
made in Table 6 remain unaltered. 
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Finally, in an attempt to check whether our sample is comparable 
with the samples used in previous research, we replicate Hogan and 
Wilkins (2008). Consistent with their findings, we find that perform-
ance-matched discretionary accruals (Kasznik 1999 or Kothari et al. 
2005) are not significantly related to WIC. When our sample firms 
with WIC are matched to non-WIC firms in the same industry (2-digit 
SIC code) and the same year which have the closest return on as-
sets, there is no significant difference in terms of the level of abso-
lute discretionary accruals in both univairate and multivariate tests. 
The above results suggest that the characteristics of our dataset are 
not different from those used in previous related research.  
CONCLUSION
The SOX requires the implementation of many new rules and pro-
cedures. In particular, Section 404 of SOX mandates management 
to assess the effectiveness of a firm’s internal control in financial 
reporting (ICOFR) and to report its conclusion in the firm’s annual 
reports for fiscal years ending after November 2004. Section 404 
also mandates the auditor to review management’s assessment, and 
then, to report her own conclusion regarding the effectiveness of the 
ICOFR. 
Using a sample of 252 firms that received an “Ineffective” audit 
opinion on the effectiveness of the ICOFR under Section 404 of SOX, 
this study investigates the effect of the enactment of SOX in year 
2002 on audit pricing. The results of various tests reveal the fol-
lowing. First, we find that audit fees were, on average, significantly 
higher in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period after 
controlling for all other factors that are deemed to affect audit fees. 
This suggests that SOX lead to an upward shift in the strength of 
the US legal environment, which in turn increased an auditor’s legal 
liability. This increased legal liability caused the auditor to charge 
higher audit fees and/or work harder. Second, we find that firms 
that received an “Ineffective” opinion on the ICOFR from their audi-
tors in response to Section 404 of SOX paid higher audit fees for 
their financial statement audits. In other words, auditors’ opinions 
on WIC are positively associated with audit fees. We also find that 
this positive association between audit fees and WIC is pronounced 
primarily in the post-SOX period (years 2003 and 2004), but not in 
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the pre-SOX period (years 2000 to 2002). The above results, taken 
as a whole, suggest that auditors either worked more or charged 
higher risk premiums to compensate for the increased legal liability 
cost associated with the audits of clients with WIC during the post-
SOX period. 
Further analyses reveal that clients with WIC that are highly 
levered and/or report losses paid higher audit fees during the 
post-SOX period, compared with not-highly-levered and/or profit-
reporting clients with WIC and clients without WIC. However, we 
find that Big 4 audit fee premium increased for both clients with 
and without WIC during the post-SOX period, whether or not the 
clients had WIC. 
Overall, our results suggest that the SOX is successful in chang-
ing auditors’ behavior by motivating them to focus more on the WIC. 
To the extent that this change results in the higher audit quality, ev-
idence provided in this study supports the view that the enactment 
of SOX accomplished its regulatory objectives at least partially. In 
conclusion, given the scarcity of empirical evidence on the issue, 
our results provide useful insights into how the auditors, in terms of 
client risk assessment and pricing mechanism, respond to the legal 
regime shift caused by the enactment of SOX. 
This study has some limitation. First, the higher audit fee does 
not necessarily imply the higher audit quality, although the fee is 
frequently used as a proxy for the quality. Second, Ge and McVay 
(2005) and Doyle et al. (2007) classify the WIC to different types. 
Due to time limitation, we do not follow the classifications. Future 
studies should investigate this issue.
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Appendix
Summary of the major SOX provisions that are important to Auditor/
Auditing
Section/Title number Key provisions
Section 101: estab-
lishment; Administra-
tive Provisions.
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (The 
Board) is established as an independent non-profit cor-
poration which shall oversee the audit of public compa-
nies that are subject to the securities laws and related 
matters. 
Section 103: Auditing, 
Quality Control, And 
Independence Stand-
ards And Rules.
The Board must require registered public accounting 
firms to “prepare, and maintain for a period of not less 
than 7 years, audit work papers, and other information 
related to any audit report, in sufficient detail to sup-
port the conclusions reached in such report.”
The Board must require a 2nd partner review (concur-
ring review) and approval of audit reports registered ac-
counting firms must adopt quality control standards. 
Section 104: Inspec-
tions of Registered 
Public Accounting 
Firms.
Annual quality reviews (inspections) must be conduct-
ed for firms that audit more than 100 issues, all others 
must be conducted every 3 years. The SEC and/or the 
Board may order a special inspection of any firm at any 
time.
Section 201: Services 
Outside The Scope Of 
Practice Of Auditors.
It shall be “unlawful” for a registered public account-
ing firm to provide any non-audit service to an issuer 
contemporaneously with the audit, including: (1) book-
keeping or other services related to the accounting 
records or financial statements of the audit client; (2) 
financial information systems design and implemen-
tation; (3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness 
opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; (4) actuarial 
services; (5) internal audit outsourcing services; (6) 
management functions or human resources; (7) broker 
or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking 
services; (8) legal services and expert services unrelated 
to the audit; (9) any other service that the Board deter-
mines, by regulation, is impermissible. 
Section 203: Audit 
Partner Rotation
The lead audit or coordinating partner and the review-
ing partner must rotate off of the audit every 5 years.
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Section/Title number Key provisions
Section 206: Conflicts 
of Interest.
The CEO, Controller, CFO, Chief Accounting Officer or 
person in an equivalent position cannot have been em-
ployed by the company’s audit firm during the 1-year 
period preceding the audit.
Section 301: Public 
Company Audit Com-
mittees.
Each member of the audit committee shall be a member 
of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall other-
wise be independent. The audit committee of an issuer 
shall be directly responsible for the appointment, com-
pensation, and oversight of the work of any registered 
public accounting firm employed by that issuer. 
Section 302: Corpo-
rate Responsibility 
For Financial Reports
The CEO and CFO of each issuer shall prepare a state-
ment to accompany the audit report to certify the “ap-
propriateness of the financial statements and disclo-
sures contained in the periodic report, and that those 
financial statements and disclosures fairly present, in 
all material respects, the operations and financial con-
dition of the issuer.”
Section 304: Forfei-
ture of Certain Bo-
nuses and Profits
If an issuer is required to prepare a restatement due 
to “material noncompliance” with financial reporting 
requirements, the chief executive officer and the chief 
financial officer shall “reimburse the issuer for any bo-
nus or other incentive-based or equity-based compen-
sation received” during the twelve months following the 
issuance or filing of the non-compliant document and 
“any profits realized from the sale of securities of the 
issuer” during that period.
Section 402: En-
hanced Conflict of 
Interest Provisions.
Generally, it will be unlawful for an issuer to extend 
credit to any director or executive officer.
Section 404: Manage-
ment Assessment Of 
Internal Controls
Requires each annual report of an issuer to contain 
an “internal control report”, which shall: (1) state the 
responsibility of management for establishing and 
maintaining an adequate internal control structure and 
procedures for financial reporting; and 
(2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the issuer’s 
fiscal year, of the effectiveness of the internal control 
structure and procedures of the issuer for financial 
reporting. Each issuer’s auditor shall attest to, and re-
port on, the assessment made by the management of 
the issuer. An attestation made under this section shall 
be in accordance with standards for attestation engage-
ments issued or adopted by the Board. 
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Section/Title number Key provisions
Section 407: Disclo-
sure of Audit Commit-
tee Financial Expert.
The SEC shall issue rules to require issuers to disclose 
whether at least 1 member of its audit committee is a 
“financial expert.”
Title VIII: Corporate 
and Criminal Fraud 
Accountability
It is a felony to “knowingly” destroy or create docu-
ments to “impede, obstruct or influence” any existing 
or contemplated federal investigation. Auditors are re-
quired to maintain “all audit or review work papers” for 
five years. The statute of limitations on securities fraud 
claims is extended to the earlier of five years from the 
fraud, or two years after the fraud was discovered, from 
three years and one year, respectively. 
Employees of issuers and accounting firms are extend-
ed “whistleblower protection” that would prohibit the 
employer from taking certain actions against employees 
who lawfully disclose private employer information to, 
among others, parties in a judicial proceeding involving 
a fraud claim. Whistle blowers are also granted a reme-
dy of special damages and attorney’s fees.  A new crime 
for securities fraud that has penalties of fines and up 
to 10 years imprisonment.
Title IX: White Collar 
Crime Penalty En-
hancements.
Maximum penalty for mail and wire fraud increased 
from 5 to 10 years. SEC is given authority to seek court 
freeze of extraordinary payments to directors, offices, 
partners, controlling persons, agents of employees. 
SEC may prohibit anyone convicted of securities fraud 
from being an officer or director of any publicly traded 
company. Financial statements filed with the SEC 
must be certified by the CEO and CFO. The certifica-
tion must state that the financial statements and dis-
closures fully comply with provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act and that they fairly present, in all mate-
rial respects, the operations and financial condition of 
the issuer. Maximum penalties for willful and knowing 
violations of this section are a fine of not more than 
$500,000 and/or imprisonment of up to 5 years.
Reference: the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Summary of 
the Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (http://www.aicpa.org)
40 Seoul Journal of Business
REFERENCE
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. Collins, and W. Kinney (2007), “The Discovery and 
Consequences of Internal Control Deficiencies prior to SOX-mandated 
Audits,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44, 166-192.
Bell, T. B., W. R. Landsman, and D. A. Shackelford (2001), “Auditors’ 
Perceived Business Risk and Audit Fees: Analysis and Evidence,” Jour-
nal of Accounting Research, 39(1), 35-43.
Beneish, M.D., M. Billings, and L. Hodder (2008), “Internal Control 
Weaknesses and Information Uncertainty,” The Accounting Review, 
83(3), 665-703.
Chaney, P., D. C. Jeter, and L. Shivakumar (2004), “Self-selection of 
Auditors and Audit Pricing in Private Firms,” The Accounting Review, 
79(1), 51-72.
Choi, J. –H., J. -B. Kim, X. Liu, and D. A. Simunic (2008), “Audit Pricing, 
Legal Liability Regimes, and Big 4 Premiums: Theory and Cross-
country Evidence,” Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(1), 55-99.
Craswell, A., J.R. Francis, and S. Taylor (1995), “Auditor Brand Name 
Reputations and Industry Specialization,” Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 20(3), 297-322.
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981), “Auditor Size and Audit Quality,” Journal of Account-
ing and Economics, 3(2), 183-199.
DeFond, M.L., F.R. Francis, and T.J. Wong (2000),  “Auditor Industry 
Specialization and Market Segmentation: Evidence from Hong Kong,” 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 19(1), 49-66. 
DeFond, M., K. Raghunandan, and K. Subramanyam (2002), “Do Non-
audit Services Fees Impair Auditor Independence? Evidence from Going 
Concern Audit Opinions,” Journal of Accounting Research, 40(4), 1247-
1274. 
DeFranco, G., Y. Guan, and H. Lu (2005), “The Wealth Change and 
Redistribution Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley Internal Control Disclosures,” 
Working Paper, University of Toronto.
Doyle, J., W. Ge, and S. McVay (2007), “Determinants of Internal Control 
over Financial Reporting,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44, 
193-223.
Dye, R. A. (1993), “Auditing Standards, Legal Liabilities and Auditor 
Wealth,” Journal of Political Economy, 101, 877-914.
Francis, J., and D. J. Stokes (1986), “Audit Prices, Product Differentiation, 
and Scale Economies: Further Evidence from the Australian Market,” 
Journal of Accounting Research, 24(2), 383-393.
Frankel, R., M. Johnson, and K. Nelson (2002), “The Relation between 
Auditors’ Fees for Non-audit Services and Earnings Quality,” The Ac-
The Effect of Internal Control Weakness Under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley ~ 41
counting Review, 77 (Supplement), 71-105. 
Ge, W., and S. McVay (2005), “The Disclosure of Material Weaknesses in 
Internal Control after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,” Accounting Horizons, 
19(3), 137-158.
Ghosh, A., and M. Lubberink (2006), “Mandated Disclosures under Section 
404: Too Little and Too Late?,” Working Paper, City University of New 
York.
Greene, W. (2000), Econometric Analysis, Prentice Hall, NJ.
Hammersley. J. S., L. Meyers, and C. Shakespeare (2008), “Market 
Reactions to the Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses and to the 
Characteristics of Those Weaknesses under Section 302 of the Sar-
banes Oxley Act of 2002,” Review of Accounting Studies, 13(1), 141-165.
Hertz, K. (2005), “The Impact of SOX on Auditor Resignations and 
Dismissals,” Working Paper. University of Washington.
Hogan. C. E., and M. S. Wilkins (2008), “Evidence on the Audit Risk Model: 
Do Auditors Increase Audit Effort in the Presence of Internal Control 
Weakness?,” Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(1), 219-242.
Hoitash, R., U. Hoitash, and J. C. Bedard (2008), “Internal Control Quality 
and Audit Pricing under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,” Auditing: A Journal 
of Practice & Theory, 27(1), 105-126.
Houston. R. W., M. F. Pratt, and H. Jamie (1999), “The Audit Risk Model, 
Business Risk, and Audit-planning Decisions,” The Accounting Review, 
74(3), 281-298.
Ijiri, Y. (2005), “US Accounting Standards and Their Environment: A 
Dualistic Study of Their 75-years of Transition,” Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy, (24), 255-279.
Johnston, K. M. and J. C. Bedard (2003), “Risk Management in Client 
Acceptance Decisions,” The Accounting Review, 78(4), 1003-1025.
Kasznik, R. (1999), “On the Association between Voluntary Disclosure and 
Earnings Management,” Journal of Accounting Research, 37(1), 57-81.
Kim, J.-B., R. Chung, and M. Firth (2003), “Auditor Conservatism, 
Asymmetric Monitoring and Earnings Management,” Contemporary Ac-
counting Research, 20, 323-359.
Kothari, S. P., A. J. Leone, and C. E. Wasley (2005), “Performance Matched 
Discretionary Accrual Measures,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
39(1), 163-197.
Khurana, I. K., and K. K. Raman (2004), “Litigation Risk and the Financial 
Reporting Credibility of Big 4 vs. Non-Big 4 Audits: Evidence from An-
glo-American Countries,” The Accounting Review, 79(2), 473-495.
Krishnan, J. (2005), “Audit Committee Quality and Internal Control: An 
Empirical Analysis,” The Accounting Review, 80(2), 649-675.
Lyon, J. D., and M. W. Maher (2005), “The Importance of Business Risk in 
Setting Audit Fees: Evidence form Cases of Client Misconduct,” Journal 
42 Seoul Journal of Business
of Accounting Research, 43(1), 133-151.
Menon, K. and D. D. Williams (2001), “Error Cost and Auditors’ Termination 
Decisions,” Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 14(2), 95-123.
Moody’s Investor Service (2005), “Section 404 Reporting on Internal Control: 
Our Early Experience,” Special Comment (April).
Palmrose, Z. (1997), “Who Got Sued?,” Journal of Accountancy, 183(3), 67-
69.
Pratt, J., and J. D. Stice (1994), “The Effects of Client Characteristics on 
Auditor Litigation Risk Judgments, Required Audit Evidence, and 
Recommended Audit Fees,” The Accounting Review, 69(4), 639-656.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (2004), “An Audit 
of Internal Control over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction 
with an Audit of Financial Statements,” Auditing Standards No. 2. 
Washington, D.C.: PCAOB
Raghunandan, K., and D. V. Rama (2006), “SOX Section 404 Material 
Weakness Disclosures and Audit Fees,” Auditing: A Journal of Practice 
and Theory, 25(1), 99-114.
Reynolds, J.L., D. Deis, and J.R. Francis (2004), “Professional Service Fees 
and Auditor Objectivity,” Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 
23(1), 29-52.
Sankaraguruswamy, S., and S. Whisenant (2003), “Pricing Initial Audit 
Engagements: Empirical Evidence Following Public Disclosure of Audit 
Fees,” Working paper, University of Houston.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (1988) “Disclosure Amendments 
to Regulation S-K, Form 8-K and Schedule 14A Regarding Changes in 
Accountants and Potential Opinion Shopping Situations,” Financial 
Reporting Release No. 31 (April), SEC Docket 1140-1147, Washington, D. 
C., SEC. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (2005a), “Remarks Before the 
Economic Hub of Memphis,” Speech by SEC Commissioner (February 
16), Memphis, Tennessee, Available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/sp-
ch021605psa.htm.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (2005b), “Remarks Before the 
European Corporate Governance Summit: An SEC Commissioner’s 
View: The Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Environment for Foreign Issuer,” 
Speech by SEC Commissioner (March 2), London, England. Available at 
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch030205cag.htm.
Seetharaman, A., F. A. Gul, and S. G. Lynn (2002), “Litigation Risk and 
Audit Fees: Evidence from U.K. Firms Cross-listed on U.S. Markets,” 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(1), 91-115.
Simon, D. and J. Francis (1988), “The Effects of Auditor Change on Audit 
Fees: Tests of Price Cutting and Price Recovery,” The Accounting Re-
view, 63(2), 255-269.
The Effect of Internal Control Weakness Under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley ~ 43
Simunic, D. (1980), “The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence,” 
Journal of Accounting Research, 18(1), 161-190.
Simunic, D. A. and M. T. Stein (1996), “The Impact of Litigation Risk on 
Audit Pricing: A Review of the Economics and the Evidence,” Auditing: 
A Journal of Practice and Theory, 15(Supplement), 119-133.
White, H. (1980), “A Heteroskedasticity-consistent Covariance Matrix 
Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity,” Econometrica, 
48(4), 817-838.
Received November 28, 2008
Accepted January 12, 2009

